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Euthanasia: An Inclusive Definition 
by Patricia Mazzarella 
Georgetown University 
We continue to share with our remotest ancestors the most tangled and evasive 
attitudes about death, despite the great distance we have come in understanding 
some of the profound aspects of biology. We have as much distaste for talking 
about personal death as for thinking about it; it is an indelicacy, like talking in 
mixed company about venereal disease or abortion in the old days. Death on a 
grand scale does not bother us in the same special way: we can sit around a dinner 
table and discuss war, involving 60 million volatized human deaths, as though we 
were talkingJlbout the weather; we can watch abrupt bloody death every day, in 
color, on films and television, without blinking back a tear. It is when the numbers 
of dead are very small and very close that we begin to think in scurrying circles. I 
Lewis Thomas, The Lives of a Cell 
We might attribute the scurrying circles to many factors. The concerns 
and fears related to our personal death and to that of near friends and 
relatives are centered both on the process of dying and on a consideration of 
what we might or might not encounter after the process is complete. 
When reasoning about the fact of death as we encounter it in the daily 
news of world and local affairs, we must maintain a degree of emotional 
detachment in order to process the information and its implications and to 
make judgments about it. If we were to permit emotion to surface to the 
extent justified over, for instance, the atrocities recently experienced in the 
Persian Gulf, the anger would render sensitive people incapable of fruitful 
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action in any part of their lives. But, when reasoning about the fact of our 
personal death or that of someone close, it is more difficult to maintain 
detachment. Our very deepest fears and concerns are touched, and 
reasoning is unavoidably influenced by those considerations. The questions 
are the same for everyone, with, perhaps, different ones having top priority: 
Is death the end of consciousness or of personal identity? 
Will there by anyone who will care lovingly for me as my control over life wanes? 
Will my psychological suffering be too great as I gradually lose control over my life? 
Will I suffer unbearable pain? 
In response to these concerns, the issue of euthanasia has aroused great 
interest. It has arisen in order to deal with the loss of autonomy during the 
dying process as physical, and sometimes psychological, competence 
wanes. It is also a proposed remedy for the physical and psychological pain 
experienced during this sometimes difficult passage. 
The term "euthanasia" is derived from Greek roots which mean good or 
happy death . Current usage has brought us to an interpretation of "good" 
as meaning quick or painless or assisted, or al1 three. The pros and cons of 
euthanasia have been argued in relation to the two common branches of 
this definition - active and passive which are qualified by whether the 
decisions to proceed are voluntary or involuntary. In this paper, I wil1 
present these arguments briefly, including the one proposed by the 
Hemlock Society that "self-deliverance," a euphemism for active 
euthanasia, is good for both the individual and society. I wil1 answer them 
from the perspective that neither of the common definitions in any of their 
interpretations develop the most inclusive understanding of the term 
"euthanasia." Neither do, in fact, al10w for an interpretation of "good" 
which is wide enough to encompass al1 of the relevant particular goods 
which are in the patient's best interest without bringing harm to others in his 
or her personal or social network. The definition of euthanasia which I 
propose is one which provides benefit to the individual while at the same 
time expanding the common good in ways that are universal1y acceptable . 
.. Although this "new definition" - actual1y an ancient one - may include 
. what is termed passive euthanasia, it is wider. It accounts for long term 
effects as wel1 as short. Very simply, it is the good that is found in being 
surrounded and assisted during the dying process by a network offamiliar, 
caring persons. 
Ethical Significance of Distinctions 
Does this seem too simple? Or unrealistic? Perhaps it will not seem so 
after we examine the philosophical structure ofthis proposal. But first , it is 
important to look briefly at the ethical significance of the sets of distinctions 
mentioned earlier. The distinction between active and passive euthanasia is 
also described as the difference between kil1ing and al10wing to die. There 
are some who say that there is never any moral relevance between kil1ing 
and al10wing to die. They propose that the rightness or wrongness is in the 
end intended (that end being to save the person suffering), that both are 
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voluntary choices honoring the person's autonomy, and that both involve 
performing an act that affects the timing of the dying process. 
Those who argue that there exists a significant moral difference base their 
considerations on the place that causality holds in those actions. To explain 
this, I would like to give you a simple graphic representation which was first 
brought to my attention by the philosopher Philippa Foot. In the case of 
active euthanasia, there is an intervention in a process which is moving from 
A to D. By adding B, a lethal injection, we are changing the process and 
causing it to move to D I. If A is birth on March 13, 1927 and D is death on 
September 27, 1990, the cause of death would be a lethal injection at DI, 
June 10, 1990. 
In the case of passive euthanasia, whether it is a decision to withdraw 
life-support or not to treat, for instance, with antibiotics , the action is not a 
matter of intervention in the process which will, if unimpeded by any other 
causal event, move from A to D. We are not adding B, which would be a 
new factor in the equation, but rather removing C, a temporary barrier 
added at some point to retard the ongoingness of the process. A person 
born at A might live to D on September 27, 1990 without any interventions 
such as life support systems which we will call C. With the help o{ C, he 
might live to October 30, 1990. And so the removal of C more or less brings 
D, the time of death, back to the original end of the process in September, 
1990. The point of this argument, then, is clearly that the new cause of death 
is not the disease or the process itself, but the actions of the person 
administering the injection or whatever. 
Long and Short Term 
A less theoretical set of considerations lies in an evaluation of the effects 
of each approach. As in all ethically significant actions, there are short and 
long term effects, both direct and indirect. The short term effects influence 
both the dying person and his or her immediate network. In the case of 
active euthanasia, all possibilities are cut off. For the individual, there is no 
possibility of benefitting from a newly discovered treatment or cure, no 
possibility of participation in research, no possibility of changing one's 
mind. For the dying person's close network, there is the likelihood of 
lowering the morale of those who perform the act, or of those who are 
aware of this act. If the person is hospitalized, there can be - with 
acceptance of active euthanasia - a diminishing of the sensitivities of the 
staff who are dedicated to preserving life. 
The long term negative effects are of two types: the slippery slope and the 
formation of cultural norms and consequent public policy. Decisions on the 
slippery slope proceed downhill morally from those which are made 
voluntarily by persons in terminal stages of incurable illness to decisions 
made for themselves by those who are nonterminal, as we saw in the 
Kevorkian case. Finally, the slide progresses to decisions made by others for 
those who are nonterminal and / or unable to make informed, rational 
decisions about their lives. This group may include handicapped and 
58 Linacre Quarterly 
so-called non-productive members of society of all ages. Such a move, 
called "crypthanasia" is well-documented in the Dutch experience. 2 The 
second long-term effect is the normalizing of a practice within a cultural, 
national, or international community. Once a practice is accepted, it tends 
to become the popular measure against which "the good" or good actions 
are measured. Members of that society then experience internal and 
external pressures to conform to that newly estalished norm. When active 
euthanasia is legalized in a culture, felt obligations to spend time, money 
and energy taking care of the dying are minimized (unless countered by 
other understandings of "good"). The result is that individuals may come to 
feel that they are burdensome to family and society and that they are 
obligated to spare others from having to care for them. And the important 
others who might be willing to form an ongoing support system are 
encouraged by the popular norm to expect that they will not be called on to 
give in any costly or time-consuming way. Terminal care could then become 
an efficient process, not to be extended beyond the boundaries set by the 
community . 
. Another foreseeable abuse arising from the policy of active euthanasia 
lies in the possibility of encouraging this decision for the purpose of 
increasing organ procurement. Euthanasia, in this case, is described as a 
benevolent act which can aid others by donation of body parts. Organ 
donation may be a good and altruistic act, but it ought not to be factored in 
any decision to hasten death. Even using a utilitarian calculus with a 
positive outcome, it would be difficult to determine the psychological 
capacity of a dying person to overcome the subtly coercive argument that 
hastening one's death to donate organs somehow increases one's worth. 
On the other hand, for those who are experiencing dying as a very 
traumatic experience, active euthanasia would shorten the period of 
suffering (and suffering is a highly subjective experience). Scarce resources 
would be freed for use by those with a good prognosis, and there might be a 
general lessening of anxiety related to the concerns of pain, loss of 
autonomy, and prolongation of the dying process. As I have argued, 
however, the benefit does not outweigh the burdens. There are better ways 
to counter the trauma and to alleviate the fears. 
In the case of passive euthanasia, or allowing to die, the practical factor 
that differentiates it from active euthanasia is that the possibilities are not 
cut off. No finality is engineered. This procedure is subject to the same 
abuses, such as being motivated by organ procurement, and similar slippery 
slope problems, such as nontreatment of treatable defects in handicapped 
newborns. However, when such abuses are avoided, euthanasia described 
as "allowing to die" has the effect of honoring the person's wishes, and so 
autonomy, without introducing an additional factor which is the cause of 
death. It preserves scarce resources only incidentally, not as an intended 
result of a culturally sanctioned act of killing. This, of course, is not the 
primary intended result of active euthanasia, but when "crypthanasia" 
begins, the balance has begun to weigh in that direction. 
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Lewis Thomas also says in his wonderful book: 
Perhaps we would not be so anxious to prolong life if we did not detest so much the 
sickness of withdrawaL It is astonishing how little information we have a bout this 
universal process. J 
What many people do not know about this universal process is that 
almost all physical pain can be alleviated. It is the psychological pain that is 
so individual and subjective. It depends on a person's worldview, beliefs 
about whether death is the end of all subjective awareness and identity, on 
the psychological strengths and weaknesses of the person - perhaps there 
has always been a struggle with suicidal tendencies and this is a welcome 
release. But the most important factor in psychological pain is often the 
existence and quality of the support network which is surrounding the 
person during what Lewis terms the withdrawal process. In our society we 
want to turn away from the unpleasant, to be upbeat and winners. Dying is 
seen as losing, unpleasant, a burden on those who would get on with their 
lives. So dying is isolating, losing contact with all one loves and values. 
Many friends and family members tend to turn away so as not to be 
reminded of the inevitability of their own mortality. 
There are some who argue that active euthanasia is a compassionate 
response to this discomfort with the dying process. As I have mentioned, 
they propose that it is a kindness on the part of a dying person to spare 
others the burdens of caring for him or her. But, again, would it not be the 
case that once this is established as a norm it would have attendant duties to 
ask for euthanasia? Those who want to live on and be cared for to the 
natural end of the process would begin to feel guilty for imposing their 
needs on reluctant others. And so the psychological pain and isolation of 
many dying persons would be increased. 
Compassion, I propose, lies not in the removal of oneself from the 
network, but in the dual role, experienced at different times in one's life, of 
caring and of allowing oneself to be cared for. By a consistent giving of 
oneself in love and support to others in one's personal network who are in 
the process of dying, it might then be reasonably expected that the period of 
one's own dying will be comfortably attended by members of an accepting 
network who consider that process a part of, not an intrusion into their life. 
The inclusive definition of euthanasia, then, is one which incorporates 
passive euthanasia, for the reasons mentioned, but encompasses a notion of 
"good" which is not limited to just that beneficent act. Compassion and 
caring in the ways indicated are the measures for a wider set of criteria by 
which we can evaluate the kinds of "good" in what we term "good death". It 
benefits the individual by preserving fully the option to be cared for as a 
reasonable personal and societal expectation. It helps to prepare each 
individual for personal death by allowing him or her to have experience 
through personal participation in the dying process of others. And it 
develops the virtues of compassion and caring in each man and woman who 
actively participates in daily assistance of his or her friend or relative. Such 
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physical and emotional support is not always comfortable for the 
inexperienced - or for the experienced, for that matter. But, just as men 
and women learn to care for infants because of love and responsibility, the 
same learning process is possible for the personal care of elders who have 
contributed so much to our lives. Would anyone consider it a state or 
medical profession responsibility to provide for infant care during that first, 
sometimes difficult year of life with crying during the night and total 
dependence? Lewis Thomas comments: 
It used to be the hardest and most important of all the services of a good doctor to 
be on hand at the time of death, and to provide comfort, usually in the home. Now 
it is done in hospitals, in secrecy (one of the reasons for the increased fear of death 
these days may be that so many people are totally unfamiliar with it; they never 
actually see it happen in real life). Some of our technology permits us to deny its 
existence, and we maintain flickers of life for long stretches in one community of 
cells or another, as though we were keeping a flag flying.4 
As for a preservation of the common good, such an inclusive 
understanding of good death avoids the slippery slope which leads to 
involuntary euthanasia and to the subtle psychological coercion for 
donation of organs. In addition, it has no place for the establishment of 
legal and practical norms which are based on the honoring of the autonomy 
of some while eliminating the support systems which would facilitate the 
exercise of automony by others who think differently. Most importantly, 
however, it prevents the desensitization of the community as a whole to the 
short and long term effects of the establishment of such a norm. 
This definition is based on an old practice, as you may have noted. The 
foundations are rooted in a philosophical perspective called an ethic of care, 
which is a morality based on the assumption that all persons are 
dynamically interconnected in a personal and social network of relations. 5 
Aristotle was aiming at this when he stressed the social embeddedness of 
persons. It counters the notion of a human being as an "economic man" or a 
social contractor equal in all ways and entitled primarily to noninterference. 
But the dying are not equal in many ways. One significant difference is that 
they are dependent on caretakers and interact in their social network from a 
position of unique vulnerability. I am proposing that this dependence, if 
accepted with graciousness, generosity, and compassion, benefits both the 
individual and society in the ways I have discussed. The dying are not 
"economic men" to be valued according to their social contributions, past 
and potential. They are members of a community who are bound by sets of 
attchments . From a care perspective, to detach and "not interfere", as one 
does in honoring the request for active euthanasia, is to abandon, to 
separate, to provide for the seeds of isolation in the neglected. 
An ethic of care stresses the honoring of attachments, those which are 
personal and those which are formed as common members of a human 
community. This is shown in availability and responsibility, often, perhaps 
usually, when it is inconvenient and not paid for. The model of economic 
man stresses impartiality and noninterference with an individual's liberty to 
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choose. The ethic of care stresses that partiality and involvement are a gift of 
the chosen and unchosen attachments that are unavoidably formed by 
members born into the world community. It is only by allowing oneself to 
fully experience such caring that one learns how to give it to others. And it is 
only by giving such caring that others learn how to continue the process 
which strengthens human bonds. In the situations of attachment which are 
a natural part of our social embeddedness, the impartiality advocated by 
proponents of the economic man model6 is not possible because one's self is 
at least partially defined by these relations with others. 
Good death, then, is a return to the ancient custom of death as attended 
by the community. Edmund Pellegrino writes that " ... sorrow and death 
are part of the tragic condition of man. They are not transcended by 
medicine so much as made bearable."7 Good medicine can alleviate the pain 
and, perhaps, some of the psychological suffering. Compassion and caring 
properly expressed can do the rest. 
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